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Reconstructing Historical Materialism: Some Key Issues 
 
What I‘d like to do in this paper is raise the general issue of how we can develop 
historical materialism in more powerful ways than Marxists have tried to do since the 
sixties. The general issue is addressed by raising three specific questions. First, how 
should Marxists periodize capitalism? Second, is there a consistent materialist 
characterization of ‗Asiatic‘ regimes, since Marx‘s Asiatic mode of production clearly 
doesn‘t work as one? And third, why have Marxists had so little to say about the 
deployment of labour? By deployment of labour I mean not the general ways of 
controlling and exploiting labour that Marx himself would repeatedly refer to in 
categories such as ‗slavery‘, ‗serfdom‘ and so on, but the organization and control of the 
labour-process in concrete settings , as in Carlo Poni‘s fine monograph on the struggle 
between landowners and sharecroppers over methods of ploughing that increased the 
intensity of labour
1
 or Hans-Günther Mertens‘ discussion of the organization of Mexican 
estates.
2
 
 
 
1. Commercial capitalism, slaveholder capitalism: the problem of configurations 
 
Let me start with the issue of slavery because that will lead into the wider issue of the 
periodization of capitalism. In the Grundrisse Marx states, ‗The fact that we now not only 
call the plantation owners in America capitalists, but that they are capitalists, is based on 
their existence as anomalies within a world market based on free labour‘.3 This has 
always struck me as one of the most intriguing passages in all of Marx‘s writings. The 
Southern slaveholders are called capitalists but their form of capitalism is anomalous, 
because capitalism for Marx presupposes free labour (or at least wage-labour) and the 
Southern plantations are clearly not based on that. On the other hand, the plantations 
clearly are capitalist enterprises (in Marx‘s eyes) or the problem of characterizing them 
wouldn‘t exist. A passage in Theories of Surplus-Value is more explicit in exposing the 
roots of the tension evident here. Here Marx writes, ‗In the second types of colonies — 
plantations — where commercial speculations figure from the start and production is 
intended for the world market, the capitalist mode of production exists, although only in a 
formal sense, since the slavery of (blacks) precludes free wage-labour, which is the basis 
of capitalist production. But the business in which slaves are used is conducted by 
capitalists. The method of production which they introduce has not arisen out of slavery 
but is grafted on to it‘.4 Here he actually states that a capitalist mode of production exists 
in the colonial plantations despite the existence of slave labour. It is clear that the two 
determinations that summed up the nature of capitalist production for Marx (the 
production of capital or the drive to accumulate, on the one hand, the domination and use 
of wage-labour on the other) were in conflict here, and that Marx seemed to think that in 
one sense at least, that of characterizing the nature of these enterprises, the former 
mattered more. By the 1860s this was certainly his position, because in Volume 2 he 
describes the money capital invested in the purchase of (slave) labour-power as ‗fixed 
capital‘,5 and in Volume 3 he states bluntly, ‗Where the capitalist conception prevails, as 
on the American plantations…‘.6 I‘d like to suggest that the real reason why Marx had to 
acknowledge the capitalist nature of the plantations was the impact of the colonial trades 
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on the equalization of the general rate of profit, in particular their role in ‗raising the 
general level of profit‘.7 ‗As far as capital invested in the colonies, etc. is concerned…the 
reason why this can yield higher rates of profit is that the profit rate is generally higher 
there on account of the lower degree of development, and so too is the exploitation of 
labour, through the use of slaves and coolies, etc. Now there is no reason why the higher 
rates of profit that capital invested in certain branches yields in this way, and brings home 
to its country of origin, should not enter into the equalization of the general rate of profit 
and hence raise this in due proportion, unless monopolies stand in the way.‘8 Again, ‗the 
average rate of profit depends on the level of exploitation of labour as a whole by capital 
as a whole.‘9 ―Labour as a whole‖, including, then, slave labour or any other form of 
labour whose exploitation generated capital. It was Marx‘s recognition of the contribution 
of the colonial trades to the general rate of profit that tilted his conception decisively in 
favour of seeing the Atlantic slave economy essentially as capitalist. 
 
   But if that is so, the implications of this view for historical materialism have scarcely 
been discussed. On the contrary, most Marxists have played it safe and forestalled such a 
discussion by endorsing an orthodoxy that has little to do with Marx himself. For 
example, in his debate with Frank, Laclau took the stand that ‗in the plantations of the 
West Indies, the economy was based on a mode of production constituted by slave 
labour‘,10 characterizing the use of slave labour as a ‗mode of production‘ when Marx 
himself had stated explicitly that a capitalist mode of production ‗exists‘ in the slave 
plantations. That was in 1971. By 1997 when Blackburn published The Making of New 
World Slavery, the same orthodoxy persisted but now in a much less confident form. ‗The 
American slave planter of the seventeenth century and after was not a capitalist — in the 
strict sense of the term, the species was only just coming into existence — but neither 
was he as far removed from capitalism as the feudal lord or the Ancient slaveowner.‘11 
Or again, ‗the undoubted fact that neither the feudal estates of Eastern Europe nor the 
slave plantations of the Americas can properly be regarded as capitalist enterprises should 
not lead us, as it has led some writers, to regard them as equivalently distant from the 
capitalist mode of production‘.12 The hesitation expressed in these passages stemmed 
presumably from Blackburn‘s deeper historical understanding of the Caribbean 
plantations. They were ‗run according to business principles which were very advanced 
for the epoch‘; ‗The construction of slave plantations did indeed require large fixed 
investments‘; ‗The performance of the early eighteenth-century sugar plantation 
embodied technical improvements in nearly every aspect of cultivation and processing‘; 
and finally, ‗the high capital value of a Caribbean slave plantation put pressure on the 
planter to maximize output from a given crew‘.13  All of which was a considerable 
advance over Laclau‘s blunt assertion of a ‗mode of production constituted by slave 
labour‘. 
 
   By contrast, the historiography of the Old South moved in the 1990s to an aggressive 
assertion of what James Oakes would call the ‗capitalist nature of the slave system‘ 
there.
14
 Genovese, Oakes argued, ‗misses the powerful force of capitalism within the 
slave system. Marx captured the essence of the problem when he wrote of capitalism as 
having been ―grafted‖ on to slavery in the Old South‘.15 A whole strand of American 
historiography had seen Southern slavery as a capitalist structure. Lewis Gray, for 
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example, had described the plantation as a ‗capitalistic type of agricultural organization 
in which a considerable number of unfree laborers were employed under unified direction 
and control‘.16 That was in the early 1930s. ‗Was not the plantation owner just another 
capitalist?‘, Barrington Moore had asked in the sixties.17 When Fogel and Engerman 
demonstrated the profitability of slavery in the 1970s, it was no longer possible to see the 
South as an economic backwater.
18
 In retrospect, Genovese was fighting a rearguard 
action and Oakes had seen why. ‗Implicitly equating capitalism with free labor, Genovese 
argues that slavery was a pre-capitalist form of social organization…‘.19 The upshot of 
the Southern debate is not, of course, that the peculiarities of the South should be 
disregarded but that Southern paternalism was not ‗intrinsically antagonistic to capitalist 
enterprise‘, not ‗necessarily a barrier to profit maximization‘.20 In other words, historical 
materialism has to be able to accommodate distinct configurations of capitalism and not 
look at the history of capitalism by simply reiterating the abstract unity of capital ‗in 
contrast to the multiplicity of its external forms‘. This method of forced abstraction will 
only contribute to stagnation and leave the best historical work to historians less 
encumbered by false notions of orthodoxy. 
 
   If it was capitalism that generated modern slavery, then we need to ask both what kind 
of capitalism and what that means for the history of capitalism more generally. Marx 
himself drew a sharp distinction between manufacture and large-scale industry and 
worked with a periodization of capitalism that contrasted the ‗period‘ of manufacture 
with that of large-scale industry. Both were  forms of the ‗modern mode of production‘ 
but manufacture was its first ‗period‘,21 which Marx saw as firmly established by the 
sixteenth century, when, as he says, ‗the modern history of capital starts to unfold‘.22 It 
was the creation of the world market that formed the great watershed of the sixteenth 
century. Manufacture ‗springs up where mass quantities are produced for export, for the 
external market — i.e. on the basis of large-scale overland and maritime commerce, in 
its emporiums like the Italian cities, Constantinople, in the Flemish, Dutch cities, a few 
Spanish ones, such as Barcelona etc.‘.23 In Volume 1 Marx was willing to concede that 
‗we come across the first sporadic traces of capitalist production as early as the fourteenth 
or fifteenth centuries in certain towns of the Mediterranean‘,24 and in the Grundrisse 
these early centuries, labelled the ‗Mercantile system‘, are called an ‗epoch‘.25 The 
variegated backgrounds and origins of this first epoch of capitalism would culminate 
eventually in the dominance of Dutch capitalism in the seventeenth century.
26
 The global 
history of capitalism between the later Middle Ages and the seventeenth century was of 
course one of the emergence and brute consolidation of the ‗colonial system‘, and it was 
Holland that ‗first brought the colonial system to its full development‘.27 A large part of 
Dutch capital was tied up in the Atlantic sugar industry.
28
 Indeed, sugar was ‗more 
heavily capitalized than any other plantation industry of that day…the industrial capital 
of the plantation …was probably not much less than half its total capital‘.29 Now, for 
Marx the striking feature of the colonial system was the fact that under it commercial 
capital ceased to be a mere mediation between extremes and dominated production 
directly.
30
 It was the fusion of merchant capital and production that formed the true 
hallmark of commercial capitalism, and if the slave plantations were exemplars of this 
form of capitalism, ‗an aspect of early modern capitalist enterprise‘, as one historian has 
described them recently,
31
 so of course were the many forms of the putting-out system 
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and the domination exercised by merchants over direct producers (weavers and other 
artisans) in a whole range of industries in Europe itself.
32
 Marx saw this type of 
capitalism transforming artisans into ‗mere wage-labourers‘33 and a likely starting-point 
for the evolution of ‗manufacture proper‘.34  
 
   The theoretical point here is that it is just not tenable to hold fast to the distinction 
between circulation and production, or between ‗capital‘ and ‗capitalism‘ (Laclau), when 
we drop the level of abstraction and depict the concrete movement of capital as this 
appears in history. The task facing materialist historiography is not the endless repetition 
of formulas valid at certain levels of abstraction but writing histories of early capitalism 
that can generate more sophisticated models of the world economy than any currently on 
offer. Laclau‘s response to Frank that the expansion of capitalism consolidated pre-
capitalist modes of production suffers from its radical incoherence. The colonial system 
was a legacy of commercial capitalism and the forms of exploitation used within it were 
not independent modes of production in any strict historical sense but forms of 
productive organization and control of labour peculiar to specific configurations of 
capital. The hybrid culture of Southern capitalism
35
 could easily count as an example of 
this sort of purely historical configuration, but the historiography of the medieval and 
early modern worlds is sufficiently rich and detailed for Marxists to be able to map more 
of them.  
 
 
2. ‘Asiatic’ regimes, or the class relations of tributary production 
 
Turning to Asiatic regimes, Anderson‘s understanding of Russian Absolutism can serve 
as the counterpart to Blackburn‘s anomalous characterization of Atlantic slavery. 
Anderson reads Russian absolutism on a European model, describing the boyars as a 
feudal aristocracy,
36
 referring to the ‗impulse within the aristocracy towards a military 
monarchy‘,37 as if Russian absolutism was the creation of a coherent aristocracy (!), and 
even arguing that ‗undiluted feudal principles were to govern the construction of the State 
machine‘.38 None of this comes remotely close to grasping the peculiarities of Russia‘s 
historical development or displaying any sense of why Trotsky for example characterized 
Tsarism as a ‗bureaucratic autocracy‘39 or ‗bureaucratic absolutism‘40 and insisted on the 
‗special features‘ that set Russia apart from western Europe.41 The issue is crucial, 
because once we have demolished the ‗Asiatic mode of production‘, which is easy to do 
(and which Anderson himself does effectively), we are left with whole continents of 
history — Byzantine, early Islamic, Russian, Ottoman, Mughal, Chinese, etc. — that 
clamour for a Marxist characterization lest they sink torpidly into the ‗absolving ocean‘ 
of feudalism.
42
 What Slavatinsky called the ‗fundamental difference which separates our 
―service nobility‖ from the feudal landowning aristocracy of Western Europe‘43 marked 
off a distinct configuration of class relationships, a ‗totality‘ of production relations,44 
quite different from feudalism. The dispossession of the old boyar aristocracy that 
culminated in the sixteenth century under Ivan the Terrible and its forcible integration 
into an expanded service class would mean that by the late sixteenth century ‗private 
property of the means of production became virtually extinct‘.45 ‗It was the combination 
 5 
of absolute political power with nearly complete control of the country’s productive 
resources that made the Muscovite monarchy so formidable an institution.‘46 
 
   On the wider canvas that stretches back to the autocracies of the Byzantine and early 
Islamic worlds, it is the feudal mode of production that appears exceptional. The more 
widespread pattern was state economy and the regimes based on it, where class relations 
were configured around the legal fiction of the sovereign as the ‗real‘ owner of all the 
land and the ruler either had no feudal elements to contend with (Muslim Spain)
47
 or 
ruthlessly subordinated such elements on the model of Ivan‘s subversion of the 
aristocracy. If, with John Haldon, we call these regimes the tributary mode of 
production,
48
 then Muslim societies lay at one extreme of a spectrum of class 
relationships defined in their case by the absence of an aristocracy in any conventional 
sense. The ‗Islamic social formation‘ (to use M. Acién‘s expression) emerged through 
conquest and, as Coulson noted, the conquered territories were retained in the ‗public 
ownership of the Muslim community‘.49 Marx even believed that it was the Muslims who 
‗first established the principle of ―no property in land‖ throughout the whole of Asia‘.50 
Be that as it may, the key institution was the iqṭa‛ or what the Russian liberal historian 
Paul Miliukov called the ‗eastern system of military holdings‘ which was eventually 
borrowed by the Muscovite princes in their creation of the pomest’ye in the fifteenth 
century.
51
 With taxation as the general form of ground-rent, the assignment of villages to 
members of the military élite (amirs, pomeshchiki, etc.) was essentially an assignment of 
revenue, so that the class relations of tributary production were defined by an inherent 
instability of property rights. At the other extreme from this tightly centralized model lie 
India and China but exemplifying a less autocratic pattern in opposite ways. If Tsarism 
encapsulated the integration of the aristocratic and the service element into a unified 
Court nobility, Trotsky‘s ‗noble bureaucracy‘,52 but one totally subservient to the ruler 
(they numbered c.3000 in 1552),
53
 then India under the Mughals, coeval with the 
paroxysm of Absolutism in sixteenth-century Russia, illustrates the falling apart of those 
elements, a model that juxtaposes a service élite with powerful regional aristocracies that 
were only loosely integrated into the administration
54
 and heavily armed to boot.
55
 This 
was certainly the most conflicted form of the tributary mode, one where Imperial 
cohesion was irreparably vulnerable to refractory aristocracies.
56
 Despite their own 
internal divisions and amorphousness, the zamindars were an entrenched source of 
subversion, a perfect counterpoint to the disciplined nobility (mansabdars) that Akbar 
had created as the backbone of his imperial State. Finally, China saw new landed élites 
emerge from the ranks of higher officialdom, once the territorial aristocracies of the 
North had finally disintegrated and a more powerful bureaucratic regime emerged in the 
great transition from T‘ang to Sung (tenth century). The ‗widespread illegal acquisition 
of landed properties‘57 was nothing new in China, and the Sung developments can be 
seen either as collusion between the bureaucracy and the landed élite or a pattern where 
powerful landed interests could dominate the government because they were leading 
members of the official class.
58
  
 
   This is hardly the place to rehearse the details of these separate forms of evolution. The 
key point here is that these variant class patterns describe the different ways in which the 
tributary mode was configured historically. This matches the point made earlier that the 
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history of the capitalist mode of production is itself best reconstructed as a movement of 
distinct historical configurations of capitalism, each absorbing the previous one (Marx 
refers to industrial capital first having to ‗destroy‘ commercial capital as an independent 
form).
59
 More importantly, there was sufficient historical connectivity between the 
different forms and exemplars of the tributary mode for us to call ‗Asiatic production‘60 
an epoch that ran concurrently with feudalism in the West and outlasted it by several 
centuries till its own eventual dissolution under the unremitting pressure of world 
capitalism, starting with zamindar rebellions and outright seizure of territory in India, 
large-scale foreign borrowings by the Ottomans, and so on. But while they lasted, the 
‗Asiatic‘ or tributary regimes had considerably more vitality than Marx ever attributed to 
the Asiatic mode.  
 
 
3. The indeterminacy of ‘free labour’ and the return to materialist categories 
 
The last issue I‘d like to raise is the incoherence of the notion of free labour. Much is 
made of free labour in run-of-the-mill discussions of historical materialism, as if the 
whole edifice of Marxist theory would collapse without the crucial cornerstones of 
free/unfree labour, economic/extra-economic coercion, and so on. These dichotomies are 
rooted in the voluntarist models of contract that sprang from the pervasive individualism 
of the nineteenth century and barely survived the searing assaults of American legal 
realism.
61
 If Marxists continue to repeat them, one imagines that is because they derive 
comfort from the illusion that free labour is essential to capitalism. But the dichotomy 
between free and unfree labour is either a tautology (under most legal systems there are 
individuals who are either free or unfree) or a remarkably naïve reposing of faith in 
freedom of contract which is assumed to be a reality when it is in fact a transparent 
fiction , even more of one today than it was in the nineteenth century, as every good 
lawyer knows.
62
 Marx called it an ‗embellishment‘ on the sale and purchase of labour-
power.
63
 Contracts between employers and workers were simply a ‗legal fiction‘.64 More 
often than not, free labour for Marx only meant labour dispossessed of the means of 
production. More illuminating than the contrast between free and unfree labour and its 
obvious potential for mystification would be a history of wage-labour itself, the 
‗differences of form‘ that Marx would doubtless have developed in his ‗special study of 
wage-labour‘,65 but reconstructed historically, with a wealth of material that scarcely 
existed for him.  
 
   Both the extent of wage-labour before capitalism and the brutality with which wage-
labourers were treated under capitalism (and still are in most parts of the world) have 
been massively underestimated by Marxists. These are both issues that only historians 
can sort out properly but they will obviously have a major bearing on the future shape of 
historical materialism. As Karen Orren writes, ‗the institution of wage labor long 
preceded the emergence of capitalism in the seventeenth century‘.66 Both the 
dispossession of labour and large-scale migrancy have been more common throughout 
history than the standard model of historical materialism suggests. Dispossessed farmers 
who worked as casual labourers or tenant-farmers on great estates in China from the late 
seventh century on,
67
 ‗runaway households‘ as the early T‘ang sources refer to such 
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impoverished peasants;
68
 the seasonal labourers who migrated from Umbria to the Sabine 
country to handle the harvests there;
69
 the substantial volume of hired labour used in 
public works at Rome;
70
 or the extensive use of wage-labour on English estates of the 
thirteenth century
71
 are random examples drawn from the history of China and Europe. 
What was distinctive about agrarian, mining and industrial capital was not the existence 
of wage-labour markets but their forcible creation — laws for the ‗enforcement of 
industry‘,72 the control of unregulated squatting on private land,73 the kind of mechanisms 
discussed by Arrighi in his classic paper ‗Labour supplies in historical perspective‘; and 
so on. That the Roman agricultural writer Varro recommended the use of wage-labourers 
for hazardous jobs
74
 suggests that the capital invested in slaves was seen as fixed capital 
and vulnerable to loss (devaluation). It was Roman civil law that evolved the first clear 
model of the buying and selling of labour-power, doubtless because the use of hired 
labour was so widespread. Indeed, Roman labour markets were incomparably less 
regulated than the labour markets of colonialism with their widespread regulation by 
master and servant regimes. For example, there were half a million contract workers in 
the tea gardens of Assam by the early twentieth century, yet ‗flogging of men and women 
was common in every garden, either for non-completion of work or for disobedience and 
desertion‘.75 The forced recruitment of wage-labour that characterized pre-industrial 
forms of capitalism shaded off into the repeated use of force against wage-labourers, even 
in England in the nineteenth century when legal coercion was widely used against craft 
workers and the English working-class was, in a technical sense at least, still ‗unfree‘ 
when Marx wrote Capital.
76
 Indeed, it may well be that the overdetermination of ‗purely‘ 
economic coercion by legal compulsion is a peculiarity of modern wage-labour markets, 
if we date the emergence of these to the Statute of Labourers in the fourteenth century.  
 
   To return to Laclau with this background behind us, the centrality of free labour to 
capitalism was the crux of his critique of Frank. Laclau‘s implicit reasoning was as 
follows: capitalism is characterized by free labour, free labour by the use of purely 
economic coercion. ‗Extra-economic‘ coercion defines non-capitalist relations of 
exploitation, and these in turn constitute pre-capitalist modes of production.  If the 
expansion of world capitalism consolidated pre-capitalist modes of production, then that 
is because it was bound up with the widespread use of non-capitalist relations of 
exploitation in the countrysides of Latin America and other parts of the Third World. The 
coherence of this picture is still seductive some forty years down the line, which is why 
Laclau continues to be cited. But taken individually, almost every link in the chain of 
reasoning is false. The contrast between servile relations of production in the periphery 
and free labour in Europe is consistently overstated. Dispossession was no less 
characteristic of the colonies then it was of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. It was sufficiently widespread in New Spain in 1633 for the abolition of 
compulsory labour to have no serious effect on the supply of farm workers to private 
estates.
77
 In South Africa, ‗the struggle to dispossess blacks on alienated land and 
subjugate them in the interests of capital accumulation proper‘ lasted throughout the 
nineteenth century. In the sheep-farming districts of the Cape interior, ‗Khoi labour was 
thoroughly proletarianised, even if subject to non-economic coercion‘.78 Second, free 
labour in the classic nineteenth-century sense that Marx understood it was certainly not 
free of penal coercion or most other forms of extra-economic compulsion.
79
 In England, 
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‗employers commonly used criminal sanctions to hold skilled workers to long 
contracts‘.80 Most peones who worked on Mexican estates in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries were not serfs but wage-labourers bound by debt.
81
 They lacked any 
means of subsistence of their own and worked full time for the estates. Thus the 
distinction between free and unfree labour collapses in a grey area which is much better 
sorted out in terms of a notion of how wage-labour markets are structured and how they 
work, especially in agriculture, than through the distorting lens of ideological categories 
that have nothing to do with historical materialism. Finally, there is no logical inference 
from non-capitalist relations of exploitation to non-capitalist relations of production. 
Slave labour can feed into the expansion of individual capitals. Forced labour under 
fascism sustained large sectors of German industry, e.g., in Volkswagen plants the 
foreigner contingent was as high as 45% by 1942, and, as Ulrich Herbert says, ‗Virtually 
all large enterprises demonstrated their strong interest in foreign skilled workers‘, i.e. 
forced labour.
82
  
 
   The more general point here is that modes of production cannot be inferred from the 
relations of exploitation that are typical of them. Their laws of motion suggest a more 
complex level of determination than any simple characterization in terms of slavery, 
serfdom, and so on. The corollary of this is that the analysis of exploitation also 
implicates a much richer, denser level of abstraction than simple taxonomies based on 
historically generic categories conceived in their abstract purity. The reason why Marxist 
historians have paid so little attention to this level of analysis, the deployment of labour, 
is that they have rarely moved beyond the general categories of labour to a grasp of the 
actual organization and control of labour-processes in history. Histories of capitalism in 
agriculture are a partial exception to this (Frank Snowden‘s work on Italy, William 
Beinart, Helen Bradford and Tim Keegan on South Africa, William Dusinberre on the 
slave-based capitalism of the Carolina ‗rice kingdom‘,83 Mertens on the Mexican estates) 
but in general the ‗special study of wage-labour‘ that Marx had planned remains a huge 
lacuna in Marxist theory. Much of his study would clearly have been about ‗distinctions 
of form‘. For example, when Tim Keegan refers to ‗white farmers‘ preference for a 
tenant labour force rather than a proletarian one‘, the contrast here is not between wage-
labourers and other forms of labour but a ‗form determination‘ within wage-labour, a 
contrast between labour-tenants and ‗pure‘ wage-labourers, paid in cash, that Keegan 
describes as a ‗proletarian work force‘.84 Again, the sharecroppers (haris) employed by 
large landlords in Sind were on one description ‗more like labourers than tenants‘. ‗They 
were hired by the season and did not necessarily work for the same zamindar in 
consecutive seasons.‘ They were a ‗floating population drifting from zamindar to 
zamindar‘.85 The ―form‖ of sharecropping doesn‘t settle the issue of the nature of 
exploitation, only a concrete grasp of the actual relations concealed within it can do that. 
Such examples could be multiplied — the Instleute on nineteenth-century Prussian 
estates, paid largely in kind, including small allotments of land;
86
 shepherds on the 
livestock haciendas of the Peruvian altiplano, whose remuneration was even more 
complex;
87
 the peculiar methods of payment used to attract the thousands of casual 
labourers that descended on the reclaimed areas of Emilia, the bulk of them women
88
 (the 
nucleus of Giuseppe Massarenti‘s ‗proletarian republic‘ at Molinella — from the 1890s to 
1920 — and the seminal base of the Italian Socialist Party); etc. In the section on ground-
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rent proposed for Volume 3, Marx, Engels noted, was planning to deal with the ‗diversity 
of forms of exploitation‘ of the Russian agricultural labour-force but ‗was never able to 
carry out this plan‘.89 There is clearly a major ‗scientific research programme‘ here that 
Marxists have barely begun to address, but when they do, with the same sense for method 
that distinguished Marx himself, we shall finally have a more complex model of the 
integration of world economy than the schematic and formalist constructions on offer 
today.   
 
        Jairus Banaji   (20/10/2009) 
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